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Abstract
Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at
constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash-
perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leader-
ship over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains,
obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting
from increased sales and higher operation costs. This number and the indus-
try inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and aggregate
sales increase due to the strategic use of inventories.
JEL Classification: L13, D43
Keywords: Inventories, Cournot, Oligopoly, Endogenous Leadership.
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1 Introduction
Inventory management is a key issue for many firms, be they large or small: well-
known management theories emphasize the need to stay lean, the gain to proceed
with just-in-time deliveries and zero inventories, or on the contrary the possibility
to benefit from economies of scale by purchasing or producing the economic-order-
quantity (Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951), Zipkin (2000)), and hence storing.
The importance of inventories in economic analysis has also been recognized. For
instance Arvan and Moses (1982) show that economies of scale in the production
of a storable good lead a monopolist to adjust its output in the long run. Social
losses then differ compared to the static case. Blanchard (1983) investigates the
behaviour of finished good inventories in the U.S. automobile industry1. Descriptive
statistics show that ”production smoothing is not the dominant element of inventory
behavior and that target inventory is probably a function of current sales” (p.374, our
emphasis), and econometric estimations confirm this finding. Using a sample of U.S.
firms from the good-producing manufacturing industries, Amihud and Mendelson
(1989) show that firms hold a larger level of inventories the greater their market
power. However an interesting theoretical question is to understand how a target
level of inventories is determined when firms are part of an oligopoly, as for example
the U.S. automobile industry, and more broadly to investigate how inventory levels
vary with the number of firms in competition. Is it possible to revert the causal
relationship, and find that a larger equilibrium level of inventories allows firms to
enjoy larger equilibrium market shares and consequently a greater market power
on an oligopolistic market? Moreover, how is the equilibrium level of inventories
affected by changes in the number of competitors, and what are the implications for
consumers’ surplus? Answering these questions is the object of this study.
Under constant returns-to-scale and in the absence of any capacity constraint,
we show that Cournot oligopolistic competition in which n firms produce to store
in a first period, before producing again and selling on the market in second period,
has a Nash-perfect equilibrium in pure strategy no matter the number of firms in
competition or the cost of storage. Equilibria can be multiple and differ according to
1Blanchard uses monthly data from January 1966 to December 1979 for 10 divisions of the main
U.S. manufacturers: 5 from GM, 2 from Ford, 2 from Chrysler and 1 from American Motors.
3
the number of firms which store. The static Cournot-Nash outcome where no firm
stores is the expected unique equilibrium of the game when the cost of storage is large
enough, but outside this range it is not an equilibrium anymore. For intermediate
or small values of the cost of storage, equilibria are such that a subset of firms is
storing a positive quantity to exert endogenously some Stackelberg leadership over
the other firms who behave as followers, who do not store and who produce and sell
in second period only. The number of firms storing at equilibrium results from the
individual trade-off between a larger market share, gained thanks to the endogenous
commitment to be more aggressive on the market by accumulating early the output,
and a smaller margin, due to the increase in aggregate sales and to the increase
in the costs of operations, which are increased by storage costs. As the number of
competitors over the two periods increases, the number of firms which can exert some
leadership increases but the individual market share of each leader decreases. Facing
a margin reduction due to larger aggregate sales and to larger operations costs, not
storing may become more profitable than storing when the number of competitors n
is large enough, and the number of leaders, which increases when n is small enough,
may decrease when n is large enough. We confirm this intuition and show that
the number of firms storing and the aggregate inventories at equilibrium can be
non monotonic with the number of firms in competition. Finally as the equilibria
are asymmetric,- except of course the Cournot one when it occurs -, concentration
increases compared to what it would be at the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium, with
identical demand and costs. We show that the Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration
index (HHI) is strictly larger than the value it obtains in static Cournot competition,
while the price-cost margin is strictly lower due to the increase in aggregate sales
caused by inventories; consumers’ surplus is therefore larger than in static Cournot
competition.
We illustrate these findings and study the effect of an entry of competitors on the
set of equilibria with an example. The number of firms storing and the aggregate
inventories are non monotonic with respect to the number of firms in competition.
As predicted, both the HHI and the aggregate sales reach levels strictly larger than
what they do in static Cournot competition when storing to gain market shares is a
profitable strategy: the market is more concentrated and aggregate sales are larger
than what it would be if storage were impossible. Together with our theoretical
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findings, these results suggest that observing a mass of firms storing is more likely
on oligopolistic markets than on market structures closer to the duopoly or to perfect
competition. Moreover they do also suggest that the HHI cannot be used as the sole
measure of competitiveness on markets where the finished product is storable and
storage is used to exert some market share leadership.
The commitment value of inventories in two-period Cournot duopolistic compe-
tition has been recognized in the literature since the path-breaking articles of Arvan
(1985) and Ware (1985). Both articles identify that once the costs of production
have been sunk, inventories endow firms with a capacity from which they can sell
while suffering no marginal cost of production. This creates an endogenous discon-
tinuity in the marginal cost the firm is facing when deciding how much to produce
and sell on the market, which may result in a first mover advantage. This effect, ob-
viously linked to Dixit (1980), implies the existence of asymmetric equilibria even if
firms are identical with respect to their production technology, and produce and sell
simultaneously in every period2. In an independent series of papers, Saloner (1987)
and Pal ((1991), (1996)) study duopolistic Cournot competition with advance pro-
duction and constant returns-to-scale, to show that multiple equilibria may co-exist,
but that this multiplicity disappears with cost variations3. The existence of the
equilibrium of an oligopolistic market for a storable product remains nonetheless
unproven, and its properties when the number of competitors changes stay therefore
unexplored.
We generalize the results obtained for a duopoly, to the case of an oligopoly and
we characterize the properties of the equilibrium when the number of competitors
over the two periods changes. First, we establish the existence of a Nash-perfect
equilibrium in pure strategy, and we characterize how the number of firms which
store at equilibrium, and how the level of individual inventories kept, depend on the
cost of storage and on the number of competitors (as well as on demand and on
2See also Spulber (1981), who studies the incentive of an incumbent to hold excess capacity at
the equilibrium of a duopoly game with sequential entry, depending whether post-entry competition
is of a Cournot or a Stackelberg type; see Ware (1984), for a different version of the game in Dixit
(1980).
3Romano and Yildirim (2005) partly generalize Saloner’s result to the broader class of duopolis-
tic games of capital accumulation. Contrary to Saloner they focus on games in which the Stackel-
berg equilibrium is unique.
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production cost parameters). Surprisingly, we prove that an increase in the number
of competitors alters the equilibria non monotonically, and that multiple equilibria
may co-exist in oligopoly, even if, in duopoly with cost differentials between periods,
the outcome is essentially unique. Finally, we analyze how the HHI changes with
the number of competitors, and we compare it to the value it obtains in static
Cournot competition: concentration in market shares increases but the price-cost
margin decreases, and hence consumers’ surplus increases. The resolution of this
game is made by constructing the backward reaction mapping proposed by Novshek
(1984) and Bamon and Fraysse´ (1985), that is by constructing the best reply of each
firm to the aggregate sales of the industry compatible with this firm optimization
program. Due to the use of inventories, backward reaction mappings turn out to
be different across firms even if firms are ex-ante identical, but for each distribution
of inventories these backward reaction mappings determine a unique and possibly
asymmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy to the second period Cournot sub-
game.
Our results are closely connected to the broader and more recent literature study-
ing the industrial organization of commodity markets4 and the strategic role of for-
ward markets. In their seminal article, Allaz and Vila (1993) show that forward
markets may be used by Cournot duopolists to compete for the Stackelberg leader-
ship. The equilibrium of the game is however symmetric, firms competing in advance
for a larger share of the market5. Our paper differs from these studies in the type of
commitment considered: while forward sales can be re-interpreted as a commitment
which places the entire industry in front of a reduced residual demand when forward
contracts are exerted, inventories are committing only the firm which is holding
them, source of the asymmetry of the Nash equilibrium. The use of inventories
and forward trading in imperfect competition has also been studied in the context
of longer dynamic games with uncertain demand and costs (see Kirman and Sobel
(1974) and Thille ((2003), (2006))).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model;
section 3 shows that for any distribution of ordered inventories across firms, it exists
4See Anderson (1984) for earlier contributions.
5See Thille and Slade (2000), Mahenc and Salanie´ (2004), and Liski and Montero (2006) for
different specifications which modify Allaz and Vila’s result.
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a unique sub-game equilibrium in which market shares can be asymmetric. Then
section 4 derives the equilibria of the game and study the effect of entry. Section 5
summarizes our results and concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a homogenous market with n Cournot competitors indexed by i, i ∈
I = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, competing over two periods indexed by t = 1, 2. Let qit be
the production level of firm i in period t, qt = (q
1
t , ..., q
n
t ) the production vector in
period t, Qt =
∑
i q
i
t the aggregate output and Q
−i
t =
∑
j 6=i q
j
t the aggregate output
of firms j 6= i.
Production may be undertaken in any period, but the market opens in period
2 only. Let si be the quantity sold by firm i in period 2. Individual sales cannot
be larger than the total output available in period 2, si ≤ qi1 + qi2. Finally we
denote s = (s1, ..., sn) the sales vector, S =
∑
i s
i the aggregate sales level and
S−i =
∑
j 6=i s
j the aggregate sales of firm j 6= i.
Firms have access to the same constant returns production technology and the
same factor prices. Each one is a ”small” buyer in the factor market, taking prices as
given. Hence all firms have the same constant marginal cost of production denoted
by c, c > 0.
We assume that pure inventory costs are nil, except the opportunity cost of the
working capital. Assuming that the capital market is perfectly competitive, and
denoting by ρ the interest rate, the only opportunity cost is the cost of producing in
period 1 rather than in period 2, that is ρ c qi1 in terms of value in period 2. Under
a free disposal assumption insuring that inventories unsold at the end of period 2
can be disposed off at zero cost, the total cost of any production and sale plan is
given by assumption A below, in period 2 value:
Assumption A. For any firm i ∈ I and any plan {(qi1, qi2, si) : si ≤ qi1 + qi2}, the
total cost incurred in second period, Ci2(q
i
1, q
i
2, s
i), is given by:
Ci2(q
i
1, q
i
2, s
i) = (1 + ρ) c qi1 + c q
i
2.
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Introducing an interest rate allows us to introduce cost differentials between
periods that help to select the number of equilibria6; we discuss more broadly this
issue after having stated our main results in section 4.
The market demand function is assumed to be linear and known to market
participants7. This insures that the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique, a useful but
not crucial property of the payoff functions8. Without loss of generality we assume
that its slope is equal to −1; we discuss this assumption at the end of section 4.
Thus:
Assumption B. Let P (S) be the inverse demand function, then
P (S) = max{a− S, 0}, a > 0.
For the ease of the analysis most of the discussion is lead under the following
assumption:
Assumption C. The intercept of the inverse demand a and the marginal cost of
production c satisfy
c ≤ a ≤ 3 c.
We discuss the importance of this assumption in section 4; it basically guarantees
that the textbook Stackelberg equilibrium is a feasible outcome of our game. If it
is relaxed the asymmetric equilibrium still exists in pure strategies but the leader
output is slightly smaller than the textbook Stackelberg output. This feature does
not occur in capital accumulation games9 as players cannot reduce their commit-
ment, while on the contrary in our game players are allowed to sell less than their
inventories. Moreover we adopt the convention that if firms inventories differ, then
6This relates to Pal’s 1991 article extending the work of Saloner (1987).
7See the path-breaking paper of Klemperer and Meyer (1986) for the analysis of imperfect
competition with demand uncertainty.
8Neither Arvan (1985) nor Saloner (1987) duopoly results rely on it. Assuming a concave
inverse demand to work under a more general quasi-concavity assumption on the payoff function
as in Romano and Yildirim (2005) would be a costly alternative in terms of mathematical content.
We chose to assume quadratic payoffs to state our results in the simplest form possible.
9See Saloner (1987) or Romano and Yildirim (2005).
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firm 1 is the one with the highest level of inventories, firm 2 is the one with the
second highest level of inventories, ..., and so on.
Convention. Firms are indexed by decreasing order of period 1 production levels,
q11 ≥ q21 ≥ ... ≥ qn−11 ≥ qn1 .
We assume that any firm can observe all the period 1 production levels but cannot
observe the period 2 production and sale levels of its competitors. We discuss this
assumption after having presented firms payoffs at the end of this section. Under
this assumption the strategy of firm i, denoted by σi, is a 3-tuple:
σi = {qi1, q˜i2, s˜i} (1)
where:
qi1 ∈ R+, q˜i2 : Rn+ → R+, s˜i : Rn+1+ → R+ (2)
with s˜i satisfying the following condition:
∀ (q1, qi2) ∈ Rn+1+ , s˜i(q1, qi2) ≤ qi1 + qi2. (3)
To any n-tuple of strategy σ, σ = {σ1, ..., σi, ..., σn}, corresponds a payoff function
πi for firm i given by, in period 2 value:
πi(σi, σ−i) = P
(∑
j 6=i
s˜j(q1, q˜
j
2) + s˜
i(q1, q˜
i
2)
)
s˜i(q1, q˜
i
2)− Ci2(qi1, q˜i2, s˜i(q1, q˜i2)). (4)
We are searching for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of
this game10.
Before analyzing our game, let us discuss the impact of the non-observability of
first period actions on our results. Doing a parallel with the way non-observability
modifies the impact of an exogenous commitment11, we conjecture that the non-
observability of inventories would not jeopardize our results, provided that we in-
troduce a communication technology precise enough. As Schelling (1960) pointed
out, the player which has a commitment must make sure the other players know
10Pal (1996) discusses for the duopoly the possibility to find mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
11See Bagwell (1991), Van Damme and Hurkens (1997) and Maggi (1998).
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this commitment: it needs a communication technology precise enough. In our pa-
per signals could for example be randomly drawn on inventory levels higher when
inventories are large than when they are small. This assumption seems realistic in
practice: for example industry reports, mid-year financial statements, or sales em-
ployees bargaining with customers may be seen as signals observed by competitors
from which posterior beliefs can be derived. We leave the study of this possibility
for another paper.
3 Sub-game equilibria
We describe now the sub-game equilibria for each vector of inventories chosen in
period 1, q1: proposition 1 presents the aggregate oligopolistic sales at the Nash
equilibrium of each sub-game. To each aggregate sales corresponds a unique vector
of equilibrium individual sales. As expected, individual and aggregate sales in equi-
librium depend on the level of inventories produced by firms in period 1, and differ
depending on how large individual inventories are. The conditions on inventories
characterizing each sub-game can be expressed as differences between the marginal
revenues obtained by firms when selling their inventories and the effective marginal
costs of production. The formal proof of these results is given in appendix A. We
now explain the main steps leading to proposition 1.
The effective marginal cost of production of Cournot oligopolists storing their
finished product is linked to, but differ from, the marginal cost of production c as
follows. As the cost of production of inventories is sunk when selling on the market
in second period, inventories can be thought of as an exhaustible capacity from
which firms can sell without producing as long as the quantity currently sold is
smaller than the quantity previously stored. The marginal cost of supplying a unit
from inventories is therefore equal to 0, as long as inventories are not exhausted.
As soon as its sales exceed its inventories, a firm must produce again and suffers
a positive marginal cost of production. Consequently bringing inventories of the
finished product from one period to another modifies the economic behaviour of
a firm by modifying its second period competitive supply. Although this effect of
inventories has already been explained12, and obviously relates to Dixit (1980), it is
12See Arvan (1985) and Ware (1985)
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useful to present it differently from older studies by introducing formally the effective
marginal cost of production of each firm, γi(si, qi1), given by
γi(si, qi1) =
 0 if si ≤ qi1c if si > qi1. (5)
Even if technologies are ex-ante identical, effective marginal costs differ across firms
once inventories have been produced, and present a firm-specific jump at si = qi1.
The set of economically feasible sales at a given market price is therefore larger when
firms store their output than when they do not: firms are now ready to sell up to
their inventories qi1 if the market price goes below their marginal cost of production
c. Consequently, by storing a quantity qi1 large enough, a Cournot competitor may
resist to an increase in its opponent sales by still preferring to release its inventories
qi1 on the market rather than reducing its sales. This effect of inventories can be
derived by confronting γi(si, qi1) to the marginal revenue m
i(si, S−i),
mi(si, S−i) = a− 2 si − S−i, (6)
to obtain the best response of a firm to an increase of its competitors’ sales. Given
the form of the effective marginal cost of production γi, the individual best reply
shows the three different types of behaviour of firm i, depending on the sales of its
competitors S−i and on its initial inventories qi1. Given q
i
1, if competitors’ sales S
−i
are such that the marginal revenue to sell qi1, m
i(qi1, S
−i), exceeds the marginal cost
c, then firm i produces again in second period and sells more than qi1. If m
i(qi1, S
−i)
is lower than the marginal cost c but positive, then firm i sells exactly its inventories.
Finally if mi(qi1, S
−i) is strictly negative, then firm i is better off selling less than its
inventories. Individual best responses are given by
ŝi(S−i, qi1) =

1
2
(a− c− S−i) if S−i ≤ a− c− 2qi1
qi1 if S
−i ∈ [a− c− 2qi1, a− 2qi1]
1
2
(a− S−i) if a− 2qi1 ≤ S−i
(7)
Inventories therefore create firm-specific kinks in firms best replies, the firm best
reply becomes locally inelastic to an increase in its competitors sales, and finally for
any given level of sales of its competitors, the level of output a firm sells is higher
when it owns inventories than when it does not. This is the source of the asymmetry
of the Nash equilibrium in our game.
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To find all the equilibria of the game, we start to define the aggregate sales
S compatible with the maximisation program of an individual firm i, by adding
S−i to the best response ŝi(S−i, qi1). We denote this function S
•
i (S
−i, qi1), and we
invert it to find the aggregate sales of firm i’s competitors compatible with firm i
maximisation program; we denote S−i(S, qi1) this function. Finally, we deduce the
individual sales of firm i which best respond to the aggregate sales S and which are
compatible with firm i’s optimization, by solving S − si = S−i(S, qi1) with respect
to si. This last operation gives us the backward reaction mapping si(S, qi1). We
then aggregate all the backward reaction mappings, and we determine the fixed
points of Sˆ(S, qi1) =
∑n
i=1 s
i(S, qi1). We draw the reader’s attention on the fact that
we describe the second period sub-game equilibria focusing on level of inventories
lower than the quantity qm a monopoly minimizing its cost of production would
produce, qm = (a − c)/2. Indeed, due to the presence of the interest rate ρ and
of n− 1 competitors, no firm stores more than the quantity a monopoly producing
in second period would sell, and all the sub-games that follow inventory choices
larger than qm for all firms are trivially dominated. This restriction turns out to be
useful when aggregating the individual best replies to derive the aggregate sales at
the Nash equilibrium. To each fixed point of Sˆ(S, qi1) corresponds a unique n-tuple
of equilibrium individual sales, and the conditions on inventories vectors leading
to each of the equilibrium sales appear to be linked to conditions on the marginal
revenues and on the marginal costs, as we now discuss.
Let us give an example of conditions on inventories leading to a particular Nash
equilibrium of the sales sub-game. To obtain a sub-game equilibrium in which firms
1, 2, ..., k sell exactly their inventories, and firms k + 1, ..., n sell strictly more than
their inventories, it suffices that given the equilibrium sales of competitors,
(1) the marginal revenue of firm k+1 when selling qk+11 is strictly higher than the
marginal cost c (so will it be for firms k+ 2, ..., n who own inventories smaller
than firm k + 1),
(2) the marginal revenue of firm k when selling qk1 is strictly lower than c (so will
it be for firms 1, ..., k − 1 who own inventories larger than firm k) and
(3) the marginal revenue of firm 1 when selling q11 is strictly positive (and so will
it be for firms 2, ..., k).
12
Indeed, when only firms i = 1, ..., k sell exactly their inventories, then in equi-
librium firms k+ 1, ..., n sell the same quantity higher than their inventories. Firms
k + 1, ..., n are therefore confronted to the same equilibrium sales of competitors
(equal to the sum of inventories of firms 1, ..., k plus (n − 1) times the quantity
sold by any of the firms k + 1, ..., n). Consequently the marginal revenues of firms
k + 1, ..., n are identical functions of individual sales s. Due to the fact that the
marginal revenue is decreasing in individual sales s, then if firm k + 1 (with the
highest level of inventories qk+11 in the group of firms {k+1, ..., n} selling more than
their inventories) faces a marginal revenue higher than the effective marginal cost
at s = qk+11 , the same must be true for all other firms in this group, explaining
condition (1).
On the contrary, the marginal revenues of firms 1, ..., k (who sell exactly their
inventories) evaluated at the equilibrium sales of their competitors jump upward
the higher the level of a firm inventories. Indeed firm i is confronted to aggregate
sales in equilibrium equal to the sum of inventories of firms 1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ...k,
plus the identical sales of firms k + 1, ..., n. This quantity is lower the higher the
level of inventories of firm i, since the aggregate level of inventories of competitors
selling these inventories is mechanically lower. The value of the marginal revenue at
si = qi1 is however lower the higher the level of inventories of the firm we consider, by
definition of the marginal revenue13, which explains why focusing on the comparison
between the marginal revenue of firm k when selling qk1 and the marginal cost c is
sufficient (condition (2)).
Finally under assumption C, and restricting our attention to q11 ≤ (a − c)/2,
condition (3) is verified as long as we consider k < n. However when we characterize
the sub-game equilibrium in which all firms are selling exactly their inventories, i.e.
such that the marginal revenue of firm n is lower than c when it sells exactly qn1 ,
then condition (3) needs to be verified. If (3) is verified, then the marginal revenues
of firms 1, ..., n − 1 are also positive, leading to the sub-game equilibrium we are
searching for.
The same analysis can be done to characterize all the sub-game equilibria, in
particular those in which some firms are selling exactly their inventories and some
others less than their inventories. To present all the sub-game equilibria, we intro-
13One replaces −qi1 by −2qi1 in each expression.
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duce the following set of notations. The sequence of sets {B(ℓ)}ℓ=0,...,2n characterizes
for each ℓ the values of inventories leading to a sales sub-game in which some firms
are selling more than, some firms are selling exactly, and some firms are selling less
than their inventories. We define this sequence as follows:
• B(0) = {q1 | m1 (q11, (n− 1)(a− c)/(n+ 1)) ≥ c} denotes the set of invento-
ries such that all firms are selling in second period strictly more than their
inventories,
• For ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, B(ℓ) denotes the set of inventories such that firms 1, ..., ℓ
are selling exactly their inventories and firms ℓ + 1, ..., n are selling strictly
more. It is defined as
B(ℓ) = {q1 | mℓ
(
qℓ1, (n− ℓ)(a− c−
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1)/(n− ℓ+ 1) +
∑ℓ−1
i=1 q
i
1
)
< c,
mℓ+1
(
qℓ+11 , (n− ℓ− 1)(a− c−
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1)/(n− ℓ+ 1) +
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1
)
≥ c},
• B(n) = {q1 | mn
(
qn1 ,
∑n−1
i=1 q
i
1
)
< c,m1 (q11 ,
∑n
i=2 q
i
1) ≥ 0} denotes the set of
inventories such that all firms are selling exactly their inventories,
• For ℓ ∈ {n+ 1, ..., 2n− 1}, B(ℓ) denotes the set of inventories such that firms
1, ..., ℓ− n sell less than their inventories and firms ℓ− n+ 1, ..., n sell exactly
their inventories. It is defined as
B(ℓ) = {q1 | mℓ−n
(
qℓ−n1 , (ℓ− n− 1)(a−
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1)/(ℓ− n + 1) +
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1
)
< 0,
mℓ−n+1
(
qℓ−n+11 , (ℓ− n)(a−
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1)/(ℓ− n+ 1) +
∑n
i=ℓ−n+2 q
i
1
) ≥ 0},
• Finally B(2n) = {q1 | mn(qn1 , (n− 1)a/(n + 1)) < 0} denotes the set of inven-
tories such that all firms sell less than their inventories.
As its proof shows (available in appendix A.), this set of notations is sufficient
to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under assumption C, restricting the attention to inventories lower
than the quantity a monopoly minimizing its costs would produce, q11 ≤ (a − c)/2,
aggregate sales at the Nash equilibrium are given by:
1. if q1 ∈ B(0), then all firms sell more than their inventories, and S∗(0) = n(a−c)n+1 ,
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2. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, then firms 1 to ℓ sell exactly their inventories
and
S∗(ℓ) =
(n− ℓ)(a− c) +∑ℓi=1 qi1
n− ℓ+ 1 ,
3. if q1 ∈ B(n) then all firms sell exactly their inventories and S∗(n) =
∑n
i=1 q
i
1,
4. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {n+1, ..., 2n−1}, then firms 1 to ℓ−n sell less than their
inventories and
S∗(ℓ) =
(ℓ− n)a+∑ni=ℓ−n+1 qi1
ℓ− n+ 1 ,
5. if q1 ∈ B(2n) then all firms sell less than their inventories and S∗(2n) = n an+1 .
As for a given level of industry sales there is a unique corresponding level of
individual sales, there is a unique vector of individual sales in equilibrium. Individual
sales in equilibrium are given in the corollary at the end of the proof of proposition
1 in appendix A. We turn now to the analysis of the equilibrium of the game.
4 Inventories in equilibrium and effect of entry
To start with, we state what cannot be an equilibrium of our game, to determine on
which of the regions {B(ℓ)}ℓ=0,...,2n we can focus the search for a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies, if it exists. The lemma below shows first that firms cannot store
in equilibrium more than what they sell in second period: as inventories are costly
to produce, firms are strictly better off storing exactly what they sell. Second, the
firm with the smallest level of inventories cannot store in equilibrium, as it is better
off waiting for the second period to produce.
Lemma 1 Any n-tuple of inventories q1 = (q
1
1, ..., q
n
1 ) such that:
(i) some firms are selling strictly less than their inventories, i.e. q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ =
n+ 1, ..., 2n,
(ii) firms who are selling strictly more than their inventories are keeping strictly
positive inventories,
cannot be an equilibrium.
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Proof. Since inventories are costly to produce, if they were selling strictly less
than their inventories, firms would be strictly better off reducing unilaterally their
inventories. Situations in which some firms are selling less than their inventories
cannot be an equilibrium: (i) holds for any value of ρ non negative.
To prove (ii) let us examine the profit of firms selling strictly more than their
inventories. Consider q1 ∈ B(ℓ): the total profit of firms i = ℓ + 1, ..., n is given by
πi(ℓ) = (a−S∗(ℓ)) si∗(ℓ)−(1+ρ) c qi1−c (si∗(ℓ)−qi1) = (a−c−S∗(ℓ)) si∗(ℓ)−ρ c qi1.
As S∗(ℓ) and si∗(ℓ) are independent of qi1 for i = ℓ + 1, ..., n, this profit is strictly
decreasing in qi1. Remark that from the expression of the bounds of the region in
which firms 1 to ℓ are selling exactly their inventories, it is needed that qℓ+11 ≤
(a − c −∑ℓi=1 qi1)/(n − ℓ + 1). This condition is trivially satisfied for qℓ+11 = 0 and
consequently the deviation to qi1 = 0 for i = ℓ + 1, ..., n belongs to B(ℓ). (ii) holds:
no firm selling more than its inventories can keep positive inventories in equilibrium.
This property of the equilibrium holds also for firm n when firms 1 to n− 1 sell ex-
actly their inventories: this firm is better off minimizing its cost by storing nothing.‖
This lemma insures that the search for an equilibrium can be restricted to n-tuple
of inventories (q11, ..., q
n
1 ) such that in the sub-games that follow, a group of firms is
selling exactly its inventories while rivals are selling strictly more. Moreover it also
proves it is cost minimizing for firms selling strictly more than their inventories not
to store at all. This applies in particular to firm n when firms 1, ..., n−1 store in first
period. Consequently the search for an equilibrium can be restricted to n-tuple of
inventories (q11, ..., q
n
1 ) belonging to region B(ℓ) for ℓ = 1, ..., n− 1, with inventories
(qℓ+11 , ..., q
n
1 ) being equal to 0.
Theorem 1 below and its corollary characterize the equilibria of the game. For
each number of firms competing over the two periods, and for every value of (a, c, ρ)
satisfying assumption C, these two results determine the n-tuple of inventories
(q1∗1 , ..., q
n∗
1 ) stored by firms at the Nash-perfect equilibrium of the game. Equi-
libria are such that a particular level of inventories are kept by ℓ firms, while n− ℓ
are not storing, under certain conditions on n and on the model parameters. The
number of firms storing, ℓ, and the individual inventories these firms keep, vary.
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The proof of these two results is long and fastidious14. It consists in four steps.
First (step 1) we determine the conditions under which the Cournot-Nash outcome is
an equilibrium. Then (step 2) we determine the equilibrium values of inventories and
the conditions on the model parameters such that ℓ firms store. More specifically to
be a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which firms 1, ..., ℓ store and firms ℓ + 1, ..., n
do not, a n-tuple of inventories q∗1(ℓ) ≡ (q1∗1 , ..., qi∗1 , ..., qℓ∗1 , 0, ..., 0) must be such that:
(a) There is no profitable individual deviation from q∗1(ℓ) within B(ℓ): q
∗
1(ℓ) is
more profitable than (q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , q
i
1, q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) for any q
i
1 such that
q1 ∈ B(ℓ) and for any firm i = 1, ..., ℓ.
(b) No firm storing finds profitable to reduce inventories down to 0: q∗1(ℓ) is more
profitable than (q1∗1 , ..., q
i−1∗
1 , 0, q
i+1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0) for any firm i ∈ {1, ..., ℓ}.
That is, firm i must not find profitable to join the group of firms producing
in second period only, to react optimally in period 2 to the inventories of the
firms storing: (b) determines a condition under which at least ℓ firms store.
(c) No firm not storing in first period finds profitable to increase inventories to join
the group of firms storing: q∗1(ℓ) is more profitable than (q
1∗
1 , ..., q
ℓ∗
1 , 0, ..., 0, q
i
1, 0, ..., 0)
for any qi1 such that q1 ∈ B(ℓ + 1) and for any firm i ∈ {ℓ+ 1, ..., n}. That is
(c) determines a condition under which at most ℓ firms store.
The conditions obtained in stages (a), (b) and (c) of step 2 are conditions on the cost
of storage ρ, and on the model parameters a and c, that permits a given number of
firms ℓ to store given the number of firms in competition n. More precisely an upper
and a lower bound on the cost of storage15 are determined. These bounds are both
functions of the number of firms n in competition and the number of firms storing
ℓ. If the cost of storage exceeds the lower bound, then at most ℓ firms keep positive
inventories, while if the cost of storage is lower than the upper bound then at least ℓ
firms keep positive inventories. The level of inventories considered must also be an
optimum for the firms that keep it, and for exactly ℓ firms to store these inventories,
the cost of storage must be in between the two bounds. Then (step 3) proves that
14See web appendix.
15More specifically the cost of storage ρc relative to the difference between the demand intercept
and the marginal cost of production, ρc/(a− c). By an abuse of terminology, we refer to ρ as being
the interest rate or equivalently here the cost of storage.
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the conditions on the model parameters determined in step 2 do not define an empty
subset, and finally step 4 verifies that all possible values of the parameters have been
covered, hence ensuring the existence of an equilibrium.
Theorem 1 The game possesses an equilibrium in pure strategies for any n ≥ 2,
and a, c, and ρ satisfying assumption C.
Proof: See web appendix.‖
Corollary 1 It exists two sequences U ≡ {U(n, ℓ)}ℓ=1,...,n−2 and L ≡ {L(n, ℓ)}ℓ=1,...,n−2,
with U(n, ℓ) ≥ L(n, ℓ) for any ℓ = 1, ..., n− 2, given by
L(n, ℓ) ≡
(
n− ℓ+ 1− 2√n− ℓ)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (2ℓ√n− ℓ+ n− 2ℓ)
and
U(n, ℓ) ≡
(
n− ℓ+ 2− 2√n− ℓ+ 1)
(n− ℓ+ 1) (√n− ℓ+ 1(ℓ− 1) + n− ℓ+ 2) ,
which are such that:
• for ρc
a−c
≥ U(n, 1), the n-tuple (0, ..., 0) is an equilibrium,
• for any ℓ = 1, ..., n−2 such that L(n, ℓ) ≤ ρc
a−c
≤ U(n, ℓ), the n-tuple (q1∗1 , ..., qn∗1 )
where
qi∗1 = q
∗
1(ℓ) =
a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc
ℓ+ 1
for i = 1, ..., ℓ and qi∗1 = 0 for i = ℓ+1, ..., n
is an equilibrium,
• for ρc
a−c
≤ L(n, n− 2), the n-tuple (q∗1(n− 1), ..., q∗1(n− 1), 0) is an equilibrium.
Proof: See web appendix.‖
The number of firms storing at equilibrium results from the trade-off between
a larger market share, obtained endogenously by an increase in inventories, and a
smaller margin due to the increase in aggregate sales and in the cost of operations.
The first case presented in the corollary above corresponds to the static Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, that occurs if the cost of storage ρ is large enough compared to
the parameters a and c, given the number of firms in competition n. The second
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case describes the equilibrium in which a subset of ℓ firms is storing, while n − ℓ
are not. When deciding to store, a firm enjoys a larger market share and increases
its profit, but it shares this leadership with ℓ− 1 other firms storing at equilibrium,
and it suffers a larger marginal cost of production compared to the n− ℓ rival firms
which do not store. These equilibria are asymmetric even if all firms are ex-ante
identical: each firm which stores sells individually more than what a firm which
does not store does. Moreover, as we have shown in the proof of the theorem and
its corollary, there may be multiple equilibria for the same values of the model
parameters: indeed U(n, ℓ) determines an upper bound on ρ below which at least ℓ
firms are storing, while L(n, ℓ) determines a lower bound on ρ above which at most
ℓ firms store. Since U(n, ℓ+1) ≥ L(n, ℓ), several possibilities for the number of firms
storing and for individual inventories at equilibrium may co-exist for a given value
of the model parameters (a, c, ρ). Finally the last case corresponds to the extreme
situation of a very small cost of storage relative to the other model parameters and
the number of firms in competition, such that all firms store the product, apart one
which prefers to wait the second period to produce and sell.
Let us characterize some properties of the equilibria compared to the static
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since the concentration in market shares is larger than
what it would be if storage were not possible, for the same model parameters and
the same number of firms in competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of
concentration should be larger when firms are able to store than when they are not,
i.e. larger in our game than in static Cournot competition (everything else equal).
Moreover aggregate sales should be larger and hence the price-cost margin smaller:
the market should be more competitive than in static Cournot competition. Indeed:
Proposition 2 When firms hold inventories, the price-cost margin is strictly lower,
and the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index is strictly higher, than the value they obtain in
static Cournot competition.
Proof: First, using corollary 1 and proposition 1, the aggregate quantity sold when
inventories are strictly positive is given by
S∗ =
ℓ (a− c− (n− ℓ+ 1)ρc)
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 1) +
(n− ℓ)(a− c)
n− ℓ+ 1
=
(n(ℓ + 1)− ℓ2) (a− c)
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 1) −
ℓρc
ℓ+ 1
(8)
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that can be compared to SCN = n(a−c)
n+1
, the aggregate sales in static Cournot com-
petition. It comes:
S∗ ≥ SCN ⇔(n(ℓ+ 1)− ℓ
2) (a− c)
(ℓ+ 1)(n− ℓ+ 1) −
n(a− c)
n+ 1
≥ ℓρc
ℓ+ 1
⇔n(ℓ+ 1)− ℓ
2
ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1) −
n(ℓ+ 1)
ℓ(n+ 1)
≥ ρc
a− c
⇔(n+ 1) (n(ℓ + 1)− ℓ
2)− (n− ℓ+ 1)n(ℓ+ 1)
ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c
⇔ℓ(ℓ+ 1)n− ℓ
2(n+ 1)
ℓ(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c ⇔
(ℓ+ 1)n− ℓ(n+ 1)
(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c
⇔ n− ℓ
(n− ℓ+ 1)(n+ 1) ≥
ρc
a− c. (9)
This condition is exactly the one that must be satisfied for q∗1(ℓ) to belong to B(ℓ),
obtained in the proof of the theorem, step 2(a), ante-last group of equations16; con-
sequently the aggregate sales of the industry when firms hold inventories are strictly
larger than the aggregate sales obtained in static Cournot competition. Hence the
market price and the price-cost margin are smaller than in static Cournot competi-
tion17. Second, the HHI is larger when firms hold inventories than in static Cournot
competition. Indeed due to the fact that firms are identical, the equilibrium would
be symmetric in static Cournot competition, and market shares identical (equal to
1/n). As we proved in corollary 1, market shares differ across group of firms when
the output is stored, and the equilibrium is asymmetric. As the HHI is the sum of
squared market shares, this grants immediately that the HHI is larger when firms
hold inventories than in static Cournot competition, where it reaches its minimum.‖.
Proposition 2 immediately implies that consumers surplus increases compared
to static Cournot competition, thanks to the strategic utilization of storage and to
the increase in aggregate sales: consumers gain surplus over producers and from
the reduction of the deadweight loss. On the other hand, the ℓ firms which store
gain profit, and the n− ℓ firms which do not store loose profit, compared to static
Cournot competition18, and moreover the industry looses profit as a whole due to
the increase in aggregate sales and due to the increase in the cost of operations of
16See (13) in the web appendix.
17See Boyer and Moreaux ((1985), (1986)) for a similar result for a Stackelberg oligopoly.
18The profit of the industry is equal to (P (S∗(ℓ))− (1 + ρ)c) ℓq∗1(ℓ) +
(P (S∗(ℓ))− c) (S∗(ℓ)− ℓq∗1(ℓ)), which is equal to (P (S∗(ℓ))− c)S∗(ℓ)− ρcℓq∗1(ℓ).
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the firms which store. When aggregating consumers surplus and industry profits to
compute the Social Welfare and compare it to the one obtained in static Cournot
competition, attention must be paid to verify whether the gain for the economy
compared to static Cournot competition exceeds the increase in the cost of opera-
tions, ρcℓq∗1(ℓ). This comparison gives another set of conditions on ρc/(a− c) which
needs to be compared to the conditions established in corollary 1. Whereas Social
Welfare increases when the cost of storage ρ is low enough, a diminution compared
to static Cournot competition is sometimes possible19, for some value of the model
parameters.
The second property of the equilibria is to vary non monotonically when the
number of firms in competition n over the two periods increases. As corollary 1
establishes, an increase in the number of leaders reduces the individual increase in
market share each of them can obtain by storing the product: storing is individually
more profitable when a few firms do the practice. On the other hand, an increase in
the number of competitors over the two periods reduces the margin of all firms. This
suggests a non monotonicity of the number of competitors storing at equilibrium20.
We confirm this possibility:
Proposition 3 The number of firms storing ℓ and the industry inventories ℓq∗1(ℓ)
may be non-monotonic in the number of firms in competition n.
Proof. Let us examine the values of the bounds on ρc/(a − c) established for the
extreme cases, ℓ = 1 and ℓ = n− 2. We have:
19See web appendix, section 2.
20The non-monotonicity occurs in our paper in a two-period game where players are engaged
in a pro-competitive practice (storage). In their study of mergers (or collusion) in static Cournot
oligopoly, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show that these anti-competitive practices may
decrease the profit of the merging companies (compared to their aggregate pre-merger profit),
depending on the number of firms present on the market pre- and post-merger, and merging.
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U(n, 1) =
n+ 1− 2√n
n(n + 1)
(10)
L(n, 1) =
n− 2√n− 1
n(2
√
n− 1 + n− 2) (11)
U(n, n− 2) = 4− 2
√
3
3((n− 3)√3 + 4) (12)
L(n, n− 2) = 3− 2
√
2
3(2(n− 2)√2− n+ 4) . (13)
It is immediate to check that the lower bounds given by (12) and (13) are strictly
decreasing with respect to n. Moreover it is possible to plot as a function of n the
upper bounds given by (10) and (11) with a mathematical software (e.g. Maxima
or Mathematica), for values n ≥ 2, to prove that it is non monotonic (concave) in
n. By continuity of U(n, ℓ) and L(n, ℓ) with respect to ℓ, there is a subset of values
for ℓ in 1, ..., n− 2 for which U(n, ℓ) and L(n, ℓ) are non monotonic in n. Therefore,
for a given value of ρc/(a − c), the number of firms storing at equilibrium, that
results from the comparison of the sequences U and L with ρc/(a− c), may be non-
monotonic in the number of firms in competition, n. It follows that the aggregate
inventories in equilibrium ℓq∗1(ℓ) can also be non-monotonic in n.‖
The intuition for this result is the following: storing to exert some leadership with
other leaders is profitable as long as the reduction in margin associated with a larger
level of inventories does not offset the gain from a larger individual market share.
The reduction in margin comes from (i), the increase in the marginal cost from c
to (1 + ρ)c, and from (ii), the increase in the aggregate volume sold (which causes
a reduction in the market price). An increase in the number of firms n increases
the number of firms which have the possibility to act as leaders, but (inspecting the
equilibrium inventory in corollary 1, second bullet), the larger the number of leaders
the smaller the individual volume gained by each firm, and (proposition 2) the larger
the aggregate volume sold. When n is large enough, the strategy of not storing at
all preserves one’s margin by avoiding the reductions described in (i) and (ii) above,
even if it is at the cost of a smaller equilibrium market share. This latter strategy is
more profitable than to store but share the leadership with ℓ − 1 other firms when
n is large enough, and suffer higher costs. The opposite force is at work when n is
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small enough: the gain from an increase in individual sales exceeds the reduction
in margin. Consequently the number of leaders ℓ increases and then decreases at
equilibrium when the number of competitors n increases, and so do the aggregate
inventories.
It is possible to study the effect of an entry of competitors on the market by using
the corollary of Theorem 1 to compute in an example the number of firms storing
at equilibrium, the aggregate inventories kept by the industry, the aggregate sales
of firms that do not store, the aggregate industry sales, and compare these values to
the outcome of static Cournot competition when the number of competitors changes.
The table below produces an example for a = 2.5, c = 1, and ρ = 0.03, generated
with a spreadsheet software.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Let us briefly describe the content of the table. Column (1) indicates the number
of firms competing on the market, column (2) (respectively (3)) the minimal (resp.
maximal) number of firms storing at equilibrium. These numbers are directly coming
from the conditions on ρ expressed in the corollary, and whenever they are identical
we suppressed the one in column (2)21. Then column (4) (resp. (5)) presents the
aggregate level of inventories stored by the minimal (resp. maximal) number of
firms storing, while column (6) (resp. (7)) shows the aggregate sales of the firms
that are not storing when the number of firms storing is minimum (resp. maximum).
Column (8) (resp. (9)) presents the total sales of the industry when the number of
firms storing is minimal (resp. maximal), that can be compared to the aggregate
sales a static Cournot oligopoly would realize, computed in column (10) and equal
to n(a− c)/(n+ 1).
As the table presents in columns (2) and (3), there may be multiple equilibria.
Moreover as column (4) and (5) show, the minimal and the maximal number of
firms storing at equilibrium, as well as the corresponding aggregate inventories of
the industry, are non monotonic in the number of firms in competition n: when
n increases, the number of firms storing at equilibrium and the level of aggregate
inventories increase, to then decrease when n is large enough. This illustrates the
21It is replaced with a −; the same convention applies to the rest of the table.
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trade-off we described: the profitability of exerting some leadership by storing de-
creases the larger the number of firms in competition for a given cost of storage.
When the number of firms is large enough, all the gains in volume obtained through
leadership are offset by losses in margin over a marginal cost that includes the cost of
storage. In that case the unique equilibrium is the Cournot-Nash one. This feature
implies that the aggregate level of inventories is non-monotonic in the number of
competitors on the market. For example when n = 6, there can be up to 3 firms
storing, and industry sales equal to 1.384 (in column (9)) are 7% higher than 1.286,
the value they reach in static Cournot competition (column (10)). For n = 13, up
to 5 firms store and sales equal to 1.447 are 3.8% higher than in static Cournot
competition. For n = 19, up to 3 firms are storing and sales equal to 1.455 are 2%
higher than in static Cournot competition.
We also compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) when the number of
firms storing is minimal (resp. maximal), presented in column (11) (resp. (12)), that
can be compared to the HHI at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (column (13)). The
aggregate sales and the market share concentration may therefore simultaneously
increase when the number of firms decreases from perfect competition to oligopolistic
market structure, and are clearly larger than their values in Cournot competition.
In the example for n = 6, the HHI is 25% higher in our model than in Cournot
(HHI = 2076 instead of 1666), and twice higher for n = 19 (HHI = 1155 instead of
526)! Comparing our results to the HHI thresholds from the U.S. Horizontal Mergers
Guidelines22, the static Cournot market with n = 10 firms would be unconcentrated
(HHI = 1000), while if 3 firms store as it is potentially the case at equilibrium,
the HHI = 1619 would make it fall into the category of moderately concentrated
markets. Aggregate sales are nonetheless larger, and the price-cost margin smaller,
when strategic inventories are used.
We conclude this section by addressing three comments, first on the role of as-
sumption C, second on the role of a small interest rate, and third on the impact
of demand uncertainty. If we relax assumption C to consider any type of market
demand, we would still get asymmetric equilibria. However there would be an addi-
tional upper limit on individual inventories to consider, in addition to the conditions
22of August 19, 2010
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in the sets B(ℓ) we presented23.
By introducing the interest rate, we made first period production slightly more
costly than second period production. This allows us to rule out of the set of
equilibria the weakly dominated ones. If there were no interest rate, the ultimate
follower would be indifferent between producing in period 1 and producing in period
2, and if this firm produces the n-firms Cournot production in period 1, then all
the other firms are also better off producing a Cournot outcome in period 1. The
result we would obtain in our game would be a generalization to the case of an
oligopoly of the result obtained for a duopoly by Saloner (1987), who shows that
any pair of inventories on the outer envelope of the Cournot reaction functions
between the two Stackelberg outcomes24 is an equilibrium in pure strategies. The
interest rate (or a cost of storage) is a selection device that forces the ultimate
follower to wait until period 2 to produce: this can be seen as a special case of the
selection criterium presented in the duopoly game by Pal ((1991), (1996))25, who
consider more generally cost differentials between periods. In an oligopoly the cost
of storage is the economic force that determines how many firms store and exert
some leadership amongst all the market competitors, allowing nonetheless different
number of firms to store at equilibrium, and hence multiple equilibria.
Finally we assumed a non-random demand26. As it is known from Klemperer
and Meyer (1986), considering a random demand at the time where firms choose
their final quantities (in second period here) does not change our results if uncer-
tainty is additive and affects the demand intercept only: firms maximize an expected
23In the duopoly game with ρ close to 0, this level is equal to the intersection between the curves
q11 =
a
2
− 1
2
q21 and q
2
1 =
a−c
2
− 1
2
q11 that is (q
1
1 , q
2
1) = (
a+c
3
, a−2c
3
). The role of assumption C is
to rule out credible threats of putting leaders with redundant inventories, by forcing prices to be
lower than the marginal cost when a follower increases its inventories to force the leader to sell less
than its inventories. Although Arvan (1985) identifies the possibility for a leader to be put with
redundant inventories in his duopoly setting, he does not show that for this threat to modify the
behaviour of the leader, it must be the case that the market price stays at a level such that the
follower realizes a non-negative profit. The fact that redundant production may matter has not
been analyzed by Saloner (1987), Pal ((1991), (1996)).
24Under extra assumptions on demand and cost missing in Saloner’s work relating to assumption
C and to the fact that leaders may be put with redundant production, as argued before.
25See also Robson (1990).
26We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this discussion.
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profit which is a function of the expected demand. It suffices to assume that this
expected demand satisfies assumption C to obtain our results. In the case where the
uncertainty affects the slope of the inverse demand, our results do not change either.
As it is known from static Cournot competition with linear demand and costs, the
slope of the inverse demand is a scale parameter of the equilibrium quantities and
profit: the smaller the slope (in absolute value), the larger the potential market and
the larger the equilibrium quantities and profits. This is also true in our model,
and it is possible to rewrite the results and the proofs of proposition 1 and theorem
1 as a function of the expected slope of the inverse demand, without changing the
conditions on the number of firms and on the interest rate ρ such that an equilibrium
with a certain number of firms storing exists27.
5 Conclusion
Without any other incentive than strategic to store, and in a perfectly symmetric
setting, this paper shows that it is possible to observe positive level of inventories
and asymmetric market shares at the equilibrium of a two-period Cournot oligopolis-
tic market, no matter the finite number of firms in competition. The rationale for
storing lies in the fact that inventories may be used to exert some market share lead-
ership, but at the cost of reduced margins. The main intuition is that by dumping
the cost of production of inventories in first period, firms obtain an endogenous but
fixed capacity from which they can sell at zero marginal cost in second period. This
marginal cost advantage translates into the search for leadership in our setting of
oligopolistic quantity competition with perfect substitutes: firms choose a level of
inventories such that their market share is increased compared to the static situa-
tion, aggregate sales are larger than when storage is impossible or the interaction
is static, and the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index is also larger. The number of firms
which store at equilibrium varies with the number of firms in competition, but as
some firms store before selling while the others produce and sell simultaneously, our
27Material available upon request. Assumption C is unaffected; the sets B(ℓ) are unchanged;
a− c and a become respectively (a− c)/b and a/b in proposition 1, where b is the expected slope
of the inverse demand. The equilibrium quantities in corollary 1 to theorem 1 are divided by b.
Equilibrium profits are inversely proportional to b, which cancels out when comparing these profits.
The sequences U and L are therefore unaffected, and proposition 2 and 3 still hold.
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paper suggests that ”make-to-stock” and ”make-to-order” organizations of the op-
erations may co-exist at the Nash equilibrium of an oligopolistic interaction on the
final market. Finally an example illustrates the fact that observing larger industry
inventories and a larger number of firms storing is more likely under an oligopolistic
market structure than under market structures closer to the duopoly or to perfect
competition: the number of firms storing and the aggregate inventories are non
monotonic in the number of market participants.
Appendix
A. Proof of proposition 1
The proof is done in 3 steps. (Step 1 ) shows how to simplify each firm second period
problem to enlighten the role of period 1 production (i.e. inventories) and derives
the individual sales each firm chooses as a best reply to the aggregate sales of its
competitors, ŝi(S−i, qi1), which depends on inventories. This step has already been
completed at the beginning of section 3. It establishes that the best response of
any firm i, ŝi(S−i, qi1), is given by equation (7). Bear in mind that as we study an
oligopolistic competition, it is possible to restrict one’s attention to period 1 inven-
tories lower or equal to the individual production of a monopoly minimizing its cost
of production, denoted qm. Given the opportunity cost of producing in period 1 in-
stead of period 2, and given the demand and costs parameters assumed before, this
quantity is equal to qm = (a−c)/2. Consequently, the vector of period 1 production
is such that q1 ∈ [0, (a− c)/2]n.
In Step 2, we aggregate all the best replies to find the equilibrium aggregate sales
of the industry. To do so, we construct the best reply of each firm to the aggregate
quantity sold by the industry, ŝi(S, qi1), and we sum these functions over all firms to
obtain the industry best reply to an aggregate sales level,
∑
i∈I ŝ
i(S, qi1) = Ŝ(S, q1).
To construct the best reply ŝi(S, qi1), also known as the backward reaction mapping
(from Novshek’s 1984 terminology) we first determine the cumulative reaction to
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S−i for firm i, S•i (S
−i, qi1) = {si + S−i/si = ŝi(S−i, qi1)}.
S•i (S
−i, qi1) =

1
2
(a− c+ S−i) if S−i ≤ a− c− 2qi1
qi1 + S
−i if S−i ∈ [a− c− 2qi1, a− 2qi1]
1
2
(a+ S−i) if S−i ≥ a− 2qi1
(14)
Then we invert it to obtain the inverse cumulative best response function S−ii (S, q
i
1)
for firm i. As S•i (S
−i, qi1) is strictly increasing it has a unique inverse,
S−i(S, qi1) =

2S − (a− c) if S ∈ [a−c
2
, a− c− qi1]
S − qi1 if S ∈ [a− c− qi1, a− qi1]
2S − a if S ≥ a− qi1
(15)
Finally we solve for the individual sale si in {si/S − si = S−i(S, qi1)}, to obtain
the backward reaction mapping,
ŝi(S, qi1) =

(a− c)− S if S ∈ [(a− c)/2, a− c− qi1]
qi1 if S ∈ [a− c− qi1, a− qi1]
a− S if S ≥ a− qi1
(16)
where as in (7), given some industry sales S, firm i can either sell more than (first
line of (16)), or sell exactly (second line of (16)), or sell less than (third line of (16))
its inventories qi1. Under assumptions C and under the convention that firm i owns
larger inventories than firm i + 1, summing all the backward reaction mappings to
obtain Ŝ(S, q1) can be done easily. Indeed for any level of industry sales S, all firms
are either selling at least their inventories or selling at most their inventories, but
it is not possible that some of them sell strictly more than their inventories, while
some others are selling strictly less. To put it differently the cut-off values for S
determining the reaction of an individual firm in (16) are ”nicely” ranked across
firms. To see this, first remark that
(a− c)/2 ≤ a− c− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− c− qn1 ≤ a− c (17)
and
a− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− qn1 . (18)
As justified in step 1, there is no loss of generality to restrict our attention to period
1 productions lower than qm = (a − c)/2. Consequently the lower bound in the
sequence of inequalities (18) can be minored, a − q11 ≥ (a + c)/2. It suffices to
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remark that as a consequence of C, the upper bound of the sequence of inequalities
(17) is lower than the lower bound of the sequence (18), i.e. a − c ≤ (a + c)/2, to
be able to rank across all firms the cut-off values at which there are kinks in the
backward reaction mappings (16)
a− c− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− c− qn1 ≤ a− q11 ≤ ... ≤ a− qn1 (19)
For a level of industry sales S lower than a− c− q11, all firms are selling more than
their period 1 production and consequently the sum of all the backward reaction
mappings is simply equal to n times the expression in the first line of (16), (a−c)−S.
For S higher than a − c − q11 and lower than a − c − q21 , firm 1 is selling exactly
its inventories and firms 2 to n are selling strictly more: the sum of the backward
reaction mappings is equal to q11 plus n − 1 times (a − c) − S, ... and so on. For
industry sales higher than a − c − qn1 and lower than a − q11, all firms are selling
exactly their inventories, and
∑
i∈I ŝ
i(S, qi1) =
∑
i∈I q
i
1 = Q1. For S higher than
a − q11 and lower than a − q21 firm 1 sells less than its inventories and firms 2 to n
sell exactly their inventories:
∑
i∈I ŝ
i(S, qi1) is equal to a − S +
∑
i≥2 q
i
1, ... and so
on to complete the summation. To summarize, Ŝ(S, q1) is given by
Ŝ(S, q1) =

n(a− c− S) if S ∈ [(a− c)/2, a− c− q11]
(n− k)(a− c− S) +∑ki=1 qi1 if S ∈ [a− c− qk1 , a− c− qk+11 ]
for k = 1, ..., n− 1
... ...∑n
i=1 q
i
1 if S ∈ [a− c− qn1 , a− q11 ]
k(a− S) +∑ni=k+1 qi1 if S ∈ [a− qk1 , a− qk+11 ]
for k = 1, ..., n− 1
... ...
n(a− S) if S ≥ a− qn1
(20)
Step 3 determines the fixed points of Ŝ(S, q1). As there are 2n cut-off values
determining the different expressions of Ŝ, there are 2 n + 1 different expressions
and potentially 2n+1 different sub-game equilibria to find. We index the consecutive
lines from (20) by ℓ = 0, ..., 2 n: at line 0 all firms sell more than their inventories,
at line 1 firm 1 sells exactly its inventories and the others more,... and so on.
At line n all firms sell exactly their inventories and at line n + 1 firm 1 sells less
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than its inventories while the others sell exactly their inventories, until line 2n. We
derive the fixed points of Ŝ(S, q1) line by line: for every line ℓ = 0, ..., 2n, there
is a unique equilibrium aggregate sales level S∗(ℓ). To this equilibrium industry
sales S∗(ℓ) corresponds a unique set of period 1 inventories B(ℓ) such that if the
vector of firms inventories q1 belongs to B(ℓ), then the equilibrium is S
∗(ℓ). Let us
describe these fixed points and the sets that are associated to them. The equilibrium
in which all firms sell more than their inventories (line ℓ = 0) is characterized by
S∗(0) = n(a− c)/(n + 1). Inventories must be such that S∗(0) ≤ a− c− q11 that is
must belong to B(0) given by
B(0) =
{
q1 | q11 ≤ (a− c)/(n+ 1)
}
. (21)
For ℓ = 1, ..., n − 1, equilibrium aggregate sales are S∗(ℓ) = ((n − ℓ)(a − c) +∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1)/(n− ℓ+ 1), and q1 must belong to B(ℓ) given by
B(ℓ) =
{
q1 | qℓ1 ≥ (a− c−
ℓ−1∑
i=1
qi1)/(n− ℓ+ 2), qℓ+11 ≤ (a− c−
ℓ∑
i=1
qi1)/(n− ℓ+ 1)
}
. (22)
For ℓ = n, S∗(n) =
∑n
i=1 q
i
1 and q1 must belong to B(n)
B(n) =
{
q1 | qn1 ≥ (a− c−
n−1∑
i=1
qi1)/2, q
1
1 ≤ (a−
n∑
i=2
qi1)/2
}
. (23)
For ℓ = n+1, ..., 2n− 1, S∗(ℓ) = ((ℓ− n)a+∑ni=ℓ−n+1 qi1)/(ℓ− n+1) and q1 ∈ B(ℓ)
such that
B(ℓ) =
{
q1 | qℓ−n1 ≥ (a−
n∑
i=ℓ−n+1
qi1)/(ℓ− n + 1), qℓ−n+11 ≤ (a−
n∑
i=ℓ−n+2
qi1)/(ℓ− n + 2)
}
. (24)
Finally for ℓ = 2n, S∗(2n) = na/(n+ 1) and q1 ∈ B(2n) such that
B(2n) = {q1/qn1 ≥ a/(n + 1)} . (25)
The intersection between (the interior of) two sets is empty, B(ℓ)
⋂
B(ℓ′) = ∅ for
ℓ 6= ℓ′, and the reunion of all sets ⋃ℓ=0,...,2nB(ℓ) encompasses exactly all the cases
for q1 we are interested in. We complete this proof by expressing the conditions
on inventories in terms of conditions on the marginal revenues to obtain our result.
Obviously,
q11 ≤
a− c
n + 1
⇔ m1
(
q11,
n− 1
n+ 1
(a− c)
)
≥ c
and so on... it remains to use the backward reaction mapping of each firm to obtain
individual sales:
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Corollary 2 (to Proposition 1) For each equilibrium level of aggregate sales S∗(ℓ),
ℓ = 0, ..., 2n, there is a unique equilibrium vector of individual sales s∗(ℓ) given by:
1. if q1 ∈ B(0), si∗(0) = a−cn+1 for any i ∈ I,
2. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, then si∗(ℓ) = qi1 for i = 1, ..., ℓ and
si∗(ℓ) =
a− c
n− ℓ+ 1 −
∑ℓ
i=1 q
i
1
n− ℓ+ 1 for i = ℓ+ 1, ..., n,
3. if q1 ∈ B(n) then si∗(n) = qi1 for all i ∈ I,
4. if q1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {n+ 1, ..., 2n− 1}, then si∗(ℓ) = qi1 for i = ℓ− n+ 1, ..., n
and
si∗(ℓ) =
a
ℓ− n + 1 −
∑n
i=ℓ−n+1 q
i
1
ℓ− n+ 1 for i = 1, ..., ℓ− n,
5. if q1 ∈ B(2n) then si∗(2n) = an+1 for any i ∈ I.
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Table 1: Computations of the equilibria and comparison with Cournot-Nash: Example.
ρ = 0.03 a = 2.5 c = 1
n ℓ min. ℓ max. ℓ× qi∗
1
at (2) ℓ× qi∗
1
at (3) (n− ℓ)× si∗ at (2) (n − ℓ)× si∗ at (3) S∗ at (2) S∗ at (3) S∗ at Cournot HHI at (2) HHI at (3) HHI at (10)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
2 - 1 - 0.720 - 0.390 - 1.110 1.000 - 5441.928 5000.000
3 - 1 - 0.705 - 0.530 - 1.235 1.125 - 4179.547 3333.333
4 - 2 - 0.940 - 0.373 - 1.313 1.200 - 2965.420 2500.000
5 2 3 0.920 1.058 0.435 0.295 1.355 1.353 1.250 2648.521 2275.686 2000.000
6 2 3 0.900 1.035 0.480 0.349 1.380 1.384 1.286 2429.112 2076.586 1666.667
7 3 4 1.013 1.104 0.390 0.297 1.403 1.401 1.313 1930.567 1702.195 1428.571
8 3 4 0.990 1.080 0.425 0.336 1.415 1.416 1.333 1812.109 1595.088 1250.000
9 3 5 0.968 1.125 0.456 0.300 1.424 1.425 1.350 1710.123 1357.341 1111.111
10 3 5 0.945 1.100 0.486 0.333 1.431 1.433 1.364 1619.032 1286.101 1000.000
11 3 5 0.923 1.075 0.513 0.364 1.436 1.439 1.375 1535.725 1222.482 909.091
12 3 5 0.900 1.050 0.540 0.394 1.440 1.444 1.385 1458.333 1164.109 833.333
13 3 5 0.878 1.025 0.566 0.422 1.443 1.447 1.393 1385.667 1109.641 769.231
14 2 4 0.740 0.936 0.702 0.513 1.442 1.449 1.400 1514.957 1168.819 714.286
15 2 4 0.720 0.912 0.724 0.539 1.444 1.451 1.406 1436.043 1113.075 666.667
16 2 4 0.700 0.888 0.747 0.565 1.447 1.453 1.412 1360.934 1059.841 625.000
17 2 4 0.680 0.864 0.769 0.591 1.449 1.455 1.417 1289.254 1008.862 588.235
18 2 3 0.660 0.765 0.791 0.689 1.451 1.454 1.421 1220.719 1072.360 555.556
19 2 3 0.640 0.743 0.812 0.713 1.452 1.455 1.425 1155.107 1017.494 526.316
20 2 3 0.620 0.720 0.834 0.737 1.454 1.457 1.429 1092.244 964.816 500.000
21 2 3 0.600 0.698 0.855 0.760 1.455 1.458 1.432 1031.991 914.227 476.190
22 2 3 0.580 0.675 0.876 0.784 1.456 1.459 1.435 974.234 865.643 454.545
23 1 2 0.405 0.560 1.047 0.897 1.452 1.457 1.438 1013.965 918.883 434.783
24 1 2 0.390 0.540 1.064 0.918 1.454 1.458 1.440 952.491 865.861 416.667
25 1 2 0.375 0.520 1.080 0.939 1.455 1.459 1.442 893.825 815.104 400.000
26 1 2 0.360 0.500 1.096 0.960 1.456 1.460 1.444 837.877 766.560 384.615
27 1 2 0.345 0.480 1.112 0.981 1.457 1.461 1.446 784.571 720.184 370.370
28 - 1 - 0.330 - 1.128 - 1.458 1.448 - 733.841 357.143
29 - 1 - 0.315 - 1.144 - 1.459 1.450 - 685.632 344.828
30 - 1 - 0.300 - 1.160 - 1.460 1.452 - 639.895 333.333
31 - 1 - 0.285 - 1.176 - 1.461 1.453 - 596.587 322.581
32 - 1 - 0.270 - 1.192 - 1.462 1.455 - 555.672 312.500
33 - 1 - 0.255 - 1.207 - 1.462 1.456 - 517.117 303.030
34 - 0 - 0.000 - 1.457 - 1.457 1.457 - 294.118 294.118
+∞ - 0 - 0 - 1.5 - 1.5 1.5 - 0 0
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